Developing Countries and the WTO by Barceló III, John J.
Cornell University Law School
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
Summer 2005
Developing Countries and the WTO
John J. Barceló III
Cornell Law School, jjb16@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the International Trade Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barceló III, John J., "Developing Countries and the WTO" (2005). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 8.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/8
8 ~ Cornell Law Forum   
Developing countries, led by China, India, and Brazil, 
are playing an increasingly important role and are  
having a dramatic impact on the WTO’s agenda.
Developing Countries  
and the WTO
tries” and shelter local producers was highly touted. 
This can be seen in Article XVIII of GATT. Under 
its provisions developing countries have wide-ranging 
authority to protect select industries with quotas that 
would otherwise run afoul of Article XI’s prohibition 
on quantitative restrictions.
 In 1979, the GATT contracting parties expand-
ed this exceptionalism for developing countries by 
adopting the Enabling Clause, a clause which allows 
industrial countries to grant the third world non-
reciprocal, preferential access to their markets. The 
industrial countries did not allow similar access to 
other GATT countries, and they got nothing in re-
turn. This violated two cardinal principles of the trade 
regime: (i) non-discrimination, and (ii) reciprocity. 
Non-discriminatory, most-favored-nation treatment 
(MFN) is enshrined in GATT Article I. Though re-
gional arrangements compromise the MFN principle, 
it is still the touchstone of the world trading system. 
Reciprocity is also central. It normally takes the form 
of mutually exchanged trade concessions agreed upon 
at periodic negotiating rounds, such as the current 
Doha Round.
 The 1979 Enabling Clause regime is known as the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Most of the 
OECD countries, including the European Union and 
the United States, have enacted such a regime, in each 
case for a select group of developing countries and a 
select group of products. These GSP programs allow 
duty-free or reduced-duty access for eligible devel-
John J. Barceló III
When the World Trade Organization (WTO) was 
founded ten years ago on January 1, 1995, commenta-
tors hailed it as a major transformation of the world 
trading system. The new, more juristic and permanent 
World Trade Organization replaced the previous, more 
pragmatic and ad hoc General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). The industrial countries, led by 
the United States, the EU, and Japan, brought about 
this change to consolidate and deepen their own and 
the world’s commitment to an open trading system. 
Their support for the change was crucial because they 
dominated the GATT, and they con-
tinue to dominate the WTO.
 The world of trade is changing, 
however, in another way. Developing 
countries, led by China, India, and 
Brazil, are playing an increasingly im-
portant role and are having a dramat-
ic impact on the WTO’s agenda. The 
earliest signs of this second transformation were visible 
in the Uruguay Round negotiations that led up to the 
WTO’s founding. In another context I have referred 
to this shift as a transition from a “Trade as Aid” to a 
“Trade as Trade” regime for developing countries—a 
transition that is still unfolding.
The Pre-Uruguay Round,  
Two-Tier GATT
During the lifespan of GATT, from 1947 to 1995, 
developing countries were largely on the sidelines of 
the world trade system. They were the recipients of 
largesse, but not serious participants in the function-
ing or governance of the regime. Theories of trade 
and development prevalent in the early part of this 
period presumed that development required shelter 
from the rigors of the competitive world market. The 
developing countries’ need to protect “infant indus-
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oping-country goods, with no reciprocal concession 
in return.
 During this pre-WTO period, another aspect of 
two-tier GATT emerged. In a series of GATT nego-
tiating rounds, the industrial members negotiated and 
adopted various “side-agreements” amending, expand-
ing, and tightening the original GATT rules. Examples 
are the Kennedy Round Antidumping Code (1968), 
the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code (1979), and 
the Tokyo Round Subsidies and Countervailing Duty 
Code (1979). A good many developing countries failed 
to adhere to these side agreements, and hence were 
not bound by their disciplines. Thus, again, one set of 
rules applied for the industrial world, and a different 
set for the developing world.
The Uruguay Round  
and Developing Countries
This two-tier GATT system began to change during 
the Uruguay Round negotiations from 1988 to 1995. 
For the ﬁrst time, the GATT membership tried to 
bring the developing countries into the trade regime 
as fully functioning partners. For example, the WTO 
came into being on the basis of what was called the 
“single undertaking.” All previous GATT members 
withdrew from the GATT and its many side agree-
ments, and simultaneously became contracting parties 
to the new WTO and all of its sub-agreements—one 
of which includes the original GATT ’47 rules. De-
veloping countries did the same.
 This arrangement reﬂected a basic bargain. The 
developing countries accepted once again the core 
GATT rules, but also all of what had previously been 
side-agreements. The bargain also required them to 
accept the new agreement on protecting intellectual 
property (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, or TRIPS). On the other side of the led-
ger, they gained advantages in agriculture and textiles. 
Though these rights were limited, they were still real. 
A new Agreement on Agriculture initiated reforms that 
have the potential to liberalize agricultural trade in the 
long term, and an amendment to the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (ATC) set a deadline of January 
1, 2005, for elimination of industrial country textile 
quotas. The amendment did not, however, reduce the 
high tariff levels on textiles.
 Although the Uruguay Round made progress on 
the third world’s behalf, it did not address the funda-
mental paradox of the two-tier system. It left the GSP 
exceptionism in place, thus continuing the system of 
reverse discrimination in favor of developing countries. 
At the same time, it failed to deal effectively with 
agricultural subsidies and tariff peaks on a range of 
developing country exports not included in GSP. Thus, 
there exists side-by-side in the current WTO regime 
both positive discrimination in favor of developing 
countries, and negative de facto discrimination against 
them. Both of these results stem, in a sense, from the 
two-tier GATT, from treating developing countries as 
only marginal, not-fully-participating members.
Perverse Positive Discrimination
Although certainly well-intentioned, the GSP non-
reciprocal, preferential regime for developing coun-
tries has disappointed many observers. Some pitfalls 
in the GSP regime are easy to grasp. As a form of 
unilaterally granted largesse or benevolence (hence the 
concept “Trade as Aid”), GSP access is unreliable and 
constrained. If a developing country exporter makes 
any real headway in capturing a substantial part of an 
industrial country’s market, a backlash from compet-
ing local producers is quick to develop and hard to 
resist. Trade ofﬁcials would be pilloried were they to 
favor developing-country entrepreneurs over home-
grown ﬁrms and workers—especially since the latter 
go to the polls. Since preferential access is a “gift” in 
the ﬁrst place, the gift can be legally withdrawn; and 
when necessary, it is.
 Moreover, attaching political conditions (“condi-
tionality”) to the “gift” has been irresistible. Thus, to 
be eligible for GSP treatment under the U.S. plan, a 
developing country must afford adequate protection 
for intellectual property, not expropriate the property 
of U.S. citizens, guarantee adequate worker rights, 
enjoy a clean bill of health on enforcing arbitral awards 
in favor of U.S. citizens, support the U.S. efforts to 
combat terrorism, and so on.1 Also, various “rules 
of origin” conditions limit the beneﬁts that might 
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otherwise ﬂow to non-eligible countries that produce 
components for a ﬁnal product assembled in an eligible 
country.
 But the greatest drawback to the GSP regime is its 
potential for perverse effects on development itself. 
Both theoretical analysis and empirical studies 2 tend to 
conﬁrm that development rates are more favorable for 
countries not participating in the preferential regimes. 
This seems to be largely—if not exclusively—because 
of political-economic effects within the developing 
country itself. Recall that the GSP regime gives ex-
porters market access without asking for reciprocity. 
Thus, the exporter constituency—normally the most 
vigorous in advocating for free trade—is absent from 
the lobbying hallways of GSP-beneﬁciary capitals. 
In consequence, the import-competing constituency 
ﬁnds itself in the happy position of calling all the 
shots on trade policy. The result is an isolated (and 
inefﬁcient) home market protected behind high tariff 
and non-tariff walls. Thus, the GSP system tends to 
produce high import barriers at home and unstable, 
politically conditioned access abroad—a bargain of 
Faustian proportions. The high import barriers cause 
misallocation of resources and inefﬁciencies that actu-
ally retard development.
Paradoxical Negative Discrimination 
The negative discrimination against developing coun-
try exports is perhaps even more pernicious, and also 
derives from two-tier GATT—in particular, from 
the non-participation of developing countries in the 
bargaining give-and-take of the periodic negotiating 
rounds. The dominant GATT players have been the 
U.S., Europe, and Japan, each of which signiﬁcantly 
subsidizes and protects agriculture. Similarly, the U.S. 
and Europe have traditionally blocked open trade in 
textiles and clothing. Many developing countries have 
natural comparative advantages in these sectors and 
would reap beneﬁts from their liberalization. Prior to 
the Uruguay Round, however, agriculture and tex-
tiles were more or less off-limits because the major 
industrial countries had no interest in liberalizing, and 
the developing countries were not even in the game. 
Two-tier GATT was the culprit.
 The winds of change ﬁrst stirred in the early stages 
of the Uruguay Round. By then, considerable rethink-
ing had occurred in the ﬁeld of development eco-
nomics. By the early 1980s, economists increasingly 
recognized that closed markets were inefﬁcient and 
counterproductive, even for developing countries, 
and that outward-looking, export-led growth was 
particularly promising. Both sides of that equation 
(opening up at home and pursuing comparative ad-
vantage abroad) called for more normal and fuller 
participation of developing countries in the reciprocal 
give-and-take of the world trade system. The Uruguay 
Round thus saw the beginning of the transforma-
tion away from two-tier GATT—a transformation 
still in progress. With developing countries partici-
pating more fully than ever before, agricultural lib-
eralization gained a foothold in the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture. The round also liberalized 
textile trade.
The Doha (Development)  
Round Challenges
Despite this progress, the challenges facing the ne-
gotiators in the current Doha Round are formida-
ble. The round began in 2001, and will perhaps be 
completed in 2007. It is known as the Development 
Round because of its emphasis on aligning the WTO 
with development goals. Some commentators have 
criticized the “Development” theme, because they 
believe—correctly, I think—that development de-
pends fundamentally on internal conditions within 
developing countries, and not so much on the prevail-
ing trade regime. But, of course, as we have seen, the 
trade regime can have important effects on an internal 
market, and can facilitate, if not directly guarantee, 
development. So what choices do the Doha Round 
negotiators face?
A seamstress works at a sewing machine at a factory in Ho Chi Minh City,  
Vietnam. The factory exports clothing and toys all over the world.
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 Despite the Uruguay Round progress, agricul-
tural barriers and subsidies remain high. The tex-
tile trade, though denuded of quotas, still faces 
high tariffs. And even though on-average indus-
trial country tariffs are low, they often peak on 
a range of goods of interest to the third world. 
Thus, developing countries have clear negotiating 
objectives.
 A strong argument can also be made for drop-
ping the non-reciprocal preferential access regime 
of GSP—or at least limiting it. This could go 
hand-in-hand with reciprocal market-opening com-
mitments on the part of developing countries. In 
other words, developing countries would begin to 
assume normal membership in a single-tier WTO— 
effectively converting the world trade body from a 
two-tier, “Trade as Aid” system to a single-tier, “Trade 
as Trade” regime.
 The very existence of the current preferential regime 
feeds opposition to such change. Even if preferential 
market access is insecure, limited, and politically con-
ditioned, some producers beneﬁt, and can be expected 
to lobby against change. They will want to hold on 
to what they have. At the same time, another trend 
may undercut their inﬂuence and even their incen-
tive to lobby forcefully. Inﬂuential voices in the trade 
community are urging industrial countries to pursue 
a “zero tariff ” target for MFN trade. 3 The closer the 
negotiators come to this goal, the less important trade 
preferences will be. So if preference margins are certain 
to shrink, lobbying for continued preferential access 
may not be worth the candle.
 Again, on the other side of the bargaining ledger, 
developing countries are pressing hard within the 
Doha Round negotiations for a substantial reduction 
and eventual end to agricultural subsidies, and for 
further liberalization of tariff peaks on third world 
exports. This is as it should be under a single-tier, 
“Trade as Trade” approach.
 It is true that some countries in the least developed 
group would be harmed both by the elimination of 
preferential access and—as net food importers—by 
the phasing out of food subsidies. For these countries, 
some have proposed a special compensatory fund, 
perhaps administered by the World Bank or other 
international organization, that could be used to ease 
the burden of transition.4
 Increasingly, of course, the bloc of countries once 
treated simply as “developing countries” will experi-
ence differentiation. It will be easier for countries like 
China, India, and Brazil, with larger, more important 
markets, to make the transition from “Trade as Aid” 
to “Trade as Trade” than it will be for the poorest and 
least developed countries. Some have even suggested 
that the more successful developing countries—whose 
tariff levels are higher than those of industrial countries 
and less likely to move to zero on the same timetable—
should consider preferential access to their markets for 
the poorest countries. This would perpetuate, however, 
the perverse effects associated with non-reciprocal pref-
erences mentioned above.
 Will the WTO continue its transition to a one-tier, 
“Trade as Trade” regime for developing countries? Will 
the negotiators succeed in eliminating agricultural 
subsidies, and in truly liberalizing trade in textiles and 
other products of interest to the Third World? Will 
industrial tariffs move dramatically toward zero? These 
are some of the challenges facing the negotiators as 
they seek a successful conclusion of the Doha “De-
velopment” Round over the next year and a half. We 
should wish them well and, if it continues to emerge, 
hail the transition to a one-tier WTO.
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A new role for developing countries would effectively 
convert the WTO from a two-tier, “Trade as Aid”  
system to a single-tier, “Trade as Trade” regime.
